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In an era of global news networks and internationally distributed media, personal 
information can be disseminated faster than ever beyond national borders. A prime 
example is the publication of topless pictures of Britain’s future Queen Consort, 
HRH Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge1 in (so far) France, Italy, Sweden, 
Denmark and Ireland. At the same time, potentially injurious media coverage may 
not always be unjustified. Comprehensive information and critical comment is 
considered essential to society. One example is the publication of mocking carica-
tures of the prophet Mohammed in the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, 
which awakened strong emotions in Muslim countries.  
However, all parties involved – the journalist, the media outlet, and the per-
son subject to such media coverage – benefit from a degree of legal protection with 
regard to their respective rights. Within this framework, it is left to courts and leg-
islators to balance the interests of the parties concerned. For this purpose many 
civilian jurisdictions in continental Europe rely on codified personality rights. Even 
in the common law, where such rights remain un-codified, similar protection of 
reputation and privacy is increasingly visible alongside the longstanding protection 
given by the law of defamation.  
Due to substantial differences in national histories, cultures, values and leg-
islative techniques, protection of privacy and reputation is treated rather diver-
gently throughout Europe. In fact, with regard to the topless photos of the Duchess 
of Cambridge, the respective domestic provisions protecting privacy vary to some 
extent. Some countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, differentiate between 
more or less intensively protected spheres in which the freedom of information, 
press and opinion outweigh the right to privacy to a greater or lesser extent. Other 
countries, such as France, regulate the protection of privacy through special norms, 
while others, such as England and Wales, subject the protection to privacy to 
piecemeal solutions. To be sure, in all European Member States any protection has 
to cede vis-à-vis issues of significant, legitimate public interest. However, what 
constitutes a legitimate public interest is yet again determined differently, due to 
the substantial differences in national histories, cultures and values, and is fre-
quently obscured by complicated distinctions between private individuals unknown 
to the public and public or political figures. 
As a result, the issue of which law ought to be applied is often decisive for 
the claim and is of great importance when, for example, the subject of injurious 
media coverage resides or maintains a significant presence in a State other than 
that where coverage was disseminated. This is also true when such material was 
obtained in a State where neither the aggrieved party nor the publisher resides. In 
                                                           
1 Formerly known as Catherine MIDDLETON. 
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essence, such a situation necessitates a coordination of the potentially applicable 
laws via private international law provisions. And although the European Union 
(EU) has unified conflict of law rules on non-contractual obligations in Regulation 
(EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
(“Rome II”), the legislator, presumably, capitulated to an influential media industry 
by excluding from its scope the infringement of privacy rights and torts to reputa-
tion, such as defamation. Despite a review clause contained in Art 30(2) Rome II 
Regulation, the aim of which is to reconsider the issue, no uniform conflict of laws 
rule has yet been agreed upon, leaving contrasting national provisions to continue 
to determine the applicable law, which in this respect is a very unsatisfactory status 
quo.  
In this article the existing proposals for a unified European conflict of laws 
rule will be critically analysed. Having exposed the weakness of these approaches 
a path for reform is suggested.  
 
 
 
I. Basics of Conflict of Laws  
In cases where a publication is disseminated in several States, conflict of laws rules 
set out to achieve two goals: (1) the harmony of outcome in like cases; and (2) the 
use of the law of the jurisdiction with the closest connection.2 For the latter, 
particularly in continental Europe and all other jurisdictions that base their private 
international law rules upon the Saviginian paradigm, the starting point is that the 
law of the country applies that is most closely connected to the legal relationship.  
As for identifying the closest connection, it is the generally accepted view 
that this is based upon neutral criteria and ultimately the intention is to apply the 
legal order best suited to the conflicting interests of both parties. The particular 
strength of SAVIGNY’S paradigm of value neutralism is that private international 
law is utilised as a neutral mediator in international disputes where law, culture, 
and values differ. In a rather formal way it regulates and coordinates issues of the 
law applicable, while leaving diversity intact.  
These considerations are the best example of legal principles derived from 
the logic of conflict of laws on a methodological level and overall are well 
established. 
 
 
 
II. Lessons from Substantive Law  
The considerations above are, however, only one part of the legal principles 
governing the methodology of this particular field of law. In addition, all concepts 
of private international law generally must be driven by the principles and values 
                                                           
2 For the roots of this idea see F.C. VON SAVIGNY, System des heutigen Römischen 
Rechts, vol. VIII (1849), p. 28, 108, 120. 
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of substantive law; both sets of rules have to be put into context and should be 
coordinated as closely as possible. 
Such an approach is constitutive, as substantive law and conflict rules are 
part of the same legal system which should not be contradictory in and of them-
selves, but should instead establish a coherent system of legal rules. Also, such 
consistency is required in connection with the infringement of privacy or reputa-
tion, particularly by the fundamental rights in the respective national legal systems, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU) and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), all of which comprise the fundamental human rights to a 
person’s reputation and privacy, on the one hand, and rights of freedom of expres-
sion and information, which extend to publications by the press, on the other hand. 
A comparative legal study of a common core of principles of substantive 
law governing privacy and reputation need not be reproduced here.3 Nevertheless, 
some distinct aspects must be emphasised as they have a corollary in private 
international law. 
 
 
A. Balancing of Interests as a Leitmotiv 
First, there is a close link between the right to privacy and reputation and the free-
dom of expression and information within the specific national, social and cultural 
framework to which the respective parties belong. All European Member States 
provide for a dynamic relationship between both fundamental rights. Indeed in 
most systems only a comprehensive balancing of the interests of both parties can 
determine whether there was a right to privacy or reputation at all and, if so, 
whether this right was infringed by the publication. Accordingly, no clear-cut rule 
favouring the press or, conversely, the aggrieved party can be found in any 
European legal system. Ultimately, a fair balancing of conflicting interests is 
always required in each individual case. 
 
 
B. Foreseeable Attribution of Damage 
The second aspect of our analysis relates to fundamental principles of tort law. 
Basically, it is understood in all European Member States that the main purpose of 
tort law is to fully compensate damage. The application of this basic principle is, 
however, limited, as any damage sustained can be compensated only when and if 
such damages can be sufficiently imputed to the tortfeasor. This extends to cases of 
infringement of privacy or reputation. If pictures of the Duchess relate exclusively 
to details of her private life and have the sole purpose of satisfying prurient inter-
ests in that respect, no substantial public interest is involved that might serve as a 
justification for their publication. In that case, there would be sufficient reasons for 
                                                           
3 For comprehensive studies see G. BRÜGGEMEIER/ A. COLOMBI CIACCHI/  
P. O’CALLAGHAN (eds), Personality Rights in European Tort Law, Cambridge 2010;  
H. KOZIOL/ A. WARZILEK (eds), Protection of Personality Rights against Invasions  
by the Mass Media, Wien/ New York 2005; Th. THIEDE, Internationale 
Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzungen, Wien 2010. 
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holding the publisher liable. If, however, the photographs relate to the exercising of 
official functions by performing senior Royal duties, a substantial public interest 
would have existed and any damage would have to borne by the Duchess.4 
It has to be emphasised that these grounds for imputation must be determi-
nable by the journalist and the media outlet before publication. Or better stated, the 
citizen’s ability to foresee the application of the laws of their State to their actions 
is a principle governing the written and unwritten constitutions of Europe. From 
this perspective it is obvious that the legislator can only impose obligations on their 
citizens as a class which is clearly defined with regard to their extent and likely 
effects. Only a rule knowable in advance gives citizens the option to adjust their 
conduct accordingly. Any unforeseeable application of a norm amounts to norma-
tive and official arbitrariness. The idea of a “chilling effect” as found in the juris-
prudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) evidences this point 
well: If, as emphasised several times by that court,5 the potential deterrent effect of 
an overly strict liability rule risks resulting in the general omission of critical jour-
nalism, any such norm is incompatible with the ECHR. Likewise, any rule must be 
unacceptable if the media outlet could not anticipate its application. 
 
 
C. Perception of the Public 
Closely related to the justification of public interest is, thirdly, the rule that the 
tortfeasor and the aggrieved party are not the only interested parties. Public interest 
and (accordingly) the assessment of whether the privacy and reputation of a person 
is harmed depends, in most European legal systems, above all on the way in which 
the relevant national community evaluates the situation.6 Concurrently, it is not the 
individual subjective view of the aggrieved party or the journalist or media outlet 
which needs to be taken into account to assess whether an infringement of privacy 
and reputation has occurred. The public interest as a justification rests on the view 
of the personally unrelated, reasonable, ordinary and fair-minded observer. Hence, 
it is the perspective of that public from the same cultural and social context that 
should count. 
 
 
D. Indivisibility of Immaterial Harm 
In sharp contrast to the question of how the wrongful breach is to be assessed, the 
calculation and compensability of damages are related to the aggrieved party alone. 
Most European legal systems agree that any non-pecuniary damages (that is, moral 
                                                           
4  See e.g. ECtHR, 24 June 2004, Caroline von Hannover/Germany [2004] ECHR 
294 (Application No. 59320/00). 
5 See e.g. ECtHR, 22 February1989, Barfod/Denmark [1989] ECHR 1 (Application 
No. 11508/85): “the Court cannot overlook […] the great importance of not discouraging 
members of the public, for fear of criminal and other sanctions, from voicing their opinions 
on issues of public concern.” 
6 See P. LAGARDE, Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 1996, p. 501: “Tout dépend évidemment du 
public atteint par les exemplaires diffusés.” 
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damages or damages for pain and suffering) are granted as a relief for the psyche 
and the state of mind of the aggrieved party, as he or she is likely to use them to 
buy alternative comforts and pleasures. To quote a Spanish proverb: los duelos con 
pan son menos – bread reduces the pain of mourning. And, without a doubt, in 
cases of infringements of privacy and reputation, it is this non-pecuniary loss that 
is often at the heart of the aggrieved party’s claim. 
Regarding the question of divisibility of such non-pecuniary damages, logic 
normally dictates that such damages are indivisible, just as are the psyche and the 
state of mind of the aggrieved party for whose relief they are granted.7 
 
 
E. Effects of the Extent of Distribution  
Finally, the sheer extent of publication of a defamatory statement, which is often 
coupled with repetition of an accusation in front of a great number of people, can 
easily create a false picture of the aggrieved party. If a false statement is repeated 
often enough and remains undisputed, the credibility of this statement increases 
because of its replication within a society. As most people fear reprisal or social 
isolation, public opinion is gauged to adhering to societal standards. As the ability 
to speak openly and address societal issues differentiates between citizens, those 
whose opinions are publicly under-represented become less likely to speak out and 
the (only alleged) majority becomes the status quo (“spiral of silence”). The mass 
media has an enormous impact on how public opinion is portrayed and can dra-
matically impact upon an individual’s perception about where public opinion lies. 
As a result, the objectivity of the public is easily lost. Only when the aggrieved 
party can generate a counterpart to such repetition can the possibility of balanced 
media coverage be secured. By pursuing his or her own individual interests the 
aggrieved party antagonises the momentum of the extent of publication.8 
 
 
                                                           
7 The sad reality of arguments in this context forcing nonsensical legal analysis is a 
point that has not gone unnoticed. To quote the admonition by Weir in another context: 
“[…] the claimant is not half-mad because of what the first defendant did and half-mad 
because of what the second defendant did, he is as mad as he is.”; see T. WEIR, The 
Maddening effect of consecutive torts, Cambridge Law Journal (CLJ) 2001, p. 238. 
8 See D.A. SCHEUFELE/ P. MOY, Twenty-five years of the spiral of silence:  
A conceptual review and empirical outlook, International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research 2000, p. 3-28; D. FUCHS/ J. GERHARDS/ F. NEIDHARDT, Öffentliche 
Kommunikationsbereitschaft: Ein Test zentraler Bestandteile der Theorie der 
Schweigespirale (1991). 
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III. Existing Proposals for a Unified European Conflict 
of Laws Rule 
A. Mainstrat Study 
As no political compromise was reached on the question of the law applicable to 
infringements of cross-border privacy and reputation, a revision clause was intro-
duced in Art 30(2) Rome II Regulation requesting a study on the situation in the 
field. Against initial hopes, this study was not carried out by a public research 
institute but, instead, by the private consultancy firm Mainstrat. The study deliv-
ered a bewildering result.9 The authors did not suggest a conflict of laws rule. 
Instead, they tried to invalidate the evident problem through reliance on statistics10 
and suggested the adoption of a directive incorporating a substantive regulation of 
the minimum essential aspects of the protection of privacy and reputation on the 
basis of the ECHR and the CFREU, that is a European private law unification of 
privacy and reputation. However, no proposal for a directive covering such mini-
mum essential aspects was provided. 
The study could arguably be endorsed for its stringent insistence that, where 
no substantial differences in law exist, a solution need not be achieved by a conflict 
of laws rule. However, a directive on the minimum essential aspects of privacy and 
reputation is in any case extremely unlikely for the time being. The Principles of 
European Tort Law (PETL), a broad-based comparative project to create the foun-
dation for discussing a future harmonisation of the law of tort in the European 
Union conducted by the European Group on Tort Law (EGTL), mentions only 
human dignity as a protected interest in its Art 2:102. The commentary to the 
PETL refers to the respective ambiguity of personality rights and the PETL do not 
provide for any rule addressing infringements of privacy and reputation at all.11 The 
subsequent research addressing a possible future unification of European private 
law by the Study Group on a European Civil Code also avoided any clear state-
ment. According to Art 2:203(2) Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) VI., 
loss caused to a person as a result of injury to that person’s reputation is only 
legally relevant if national law so provides. Thus, any application of this article 
arguably presupposes a conflict of laws rule to determine the relevant national law.  
In essence, no unification of tort law regarding privacy and reputation has 
yet been attempted, which would force the drafters of the suggested directive to 
start from scratch. Considering the often vague outlook of efforts on unification of 
European private law, it seems doubtful whether such a directive would ever be 
politically endorsed. 
                                                           
9 Comparative Study on the Situation in the 27 Member States as regards the Law 
applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations arising out of Infringements of Privacy and 
Rights relating to Personality (2009), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
civil/document/ index_en.htm>. 
10 With a sample size of merely n=371. 
11 H. KOZIOL, Basic Norm, in EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, Principles of 
European Tort Law. Text and Commentary, Wien/ New York 2005, p. 30 et seq. 
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B. Mosaic Assessment 
In Bier v Mines de potasse d'Alsace12 and Shevill,13 the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) held that a publisher could be sued at his or her place of establishment for all 
the harm caused by a publication or before the courts of each country where such 
publication was distributed and caused damage. However, in the latter case, the 
suit could be brought solely in respect of the damage caused within the respective 
court’s territory. In light of those holdings, the European Commission also ini-
tially14 favoured such a “mosaic assessment”. Parallel to the ECJ’s findings, the law 
at the place(s) of dissemination should be applied; however, the latter law(s) only 
have relevance concerning the infringement in the Member State of publication, 
whereas the law at the residence of the media outlet applies to the whole Union-
wide publication. The term “mosaic assessment” depicts, where damage is sus-
tained in several Member States, that the laws of all Member States concerned will 
have to be applied on a distributive basis as tiny pieces, thus together giving the 
full picture of the mosaic, which is full compensation. 
Without explicit reference, this theory is arguably driven by prejudices 
against foreign law and is constructed along the following lines. The question of 
whether and when an infringement of personality rights existed or is justified 
depends largely on national culture, which can differ fundamentally even within 
Europe. A distributive application would then appear to fit perfectly. In the contin-
ued absence of a consensus of European values concerning privacy and reputation, 
it seems appropriate to leave enough room for the differences using a distributive 
application of local national laws.15 
Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the applicable law as a result of the 
mosaic assessment is in stark contrast with the intellectual development of conflict 
of laws in Europe over the last 150 years. Starting with von Savigny, it became the 
unanimous consensus that, from a multitude of unambiguous national connections 
to a legal dispute, the law of the country that is most closely connected to the dis-
pute should govern the whole case. As mentioned above, the particular strength of 
this approach is that conflict of laws is utilised as a neutral mediator in interna-
tional disputes where law, culture and values differ. Resting on the differences 
between legal systems as an argument was the style of early 19th century German 
discussion, but is not a characteristic of any contemporary approach. Certainly, 
legal systems are different and the manner in which privacy and reputation are 
conceived and enshrined differs as well, but this does not mean that the legal order 
of every marginally affected State must be taken into account. The cultural dimen-
                                                           
12 ECJ, C-21/76, Bier v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, [1976] ECR 1735. 
13 ECJ, C-68/93, Fiona Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA, [1995] ECR I-415. 
14 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to Non-
contractual obligation (Rome II) COM(2003) 427 final, p. 11: “The rule entails, where 
damage is sustained in several countries, that the laws of all the countries concerned will 
have to be applied on a distributive basis, applying what is known as «Mosaikbetrachtung» 
in German law.”  
15 See, for instance, OLG (Oberlandesgericht) Hamburg 8 December 1994, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift –Rechtsprechungsreport (NJW-RR) 1995, p. 792. 
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sion of personality rights is no excuse to circumvent the idea of the closest connec-
tion. Indeed, to allow such an approach is to rely on the historically out-dated prin-
ciple of territoriality.  
As a result, problems exist with a mosaic assessment when taking into 
account the non-pecuniary damages granted for infringement of privacy and 
defamatory statements. As mentioned at the outset, for this category of damages 
the situation in the substantive law of European States is clear: As non-pecuniary 
damages are granted for the relief of the unitary state of mind of the aggrieved 
party, they are also unitary and indivisible. Accordingly, in the context of conflict 
of laws, such damages differ proportionally depending on the number of times that 
a publication appears. Nevertheless, one degrading publication in multiple coun-
tries results in only one infringement of the feelings of the aggrieved party and, 
thus, in only one damages award. The psyche and the state of mind of the 
aggrieved party is relieved only once, not every time the same publication appears 
in a different country. Alternative comforts and pleasures for which non-pecuniary 
damages are granted are assessed only once and by one legal system.  
Echoing such implausible fragmentation, one also has to doubt the general 
practicability of the concept in more realistic cases where a defamatory publication 
is distributed not only in two or three European Member States but many more. At 
first glance the ECJ’s decision in Shevill may provide some help, since the judges 
held that the whole infringement could be compensated in the domicile of the 
media company. If the mosaic assessment is applied, contrary to the arguably good 
intentions of the ECJ, the court at the media outlet’s domicile has to apply the laws 
of all the places where the publication was distributed depending on the respective 
infringement in that country. In other words, the judge at the domicile of the media 
outlet must apply all laws where the publication was disseminated to assess the 
damages granted to the aggrieved party. This includes determining the loss of 
reputation territorially, that is, to assess whether and to what extent the aggrieved 
party’s standing was lowered and whether this was justified according to the 
Member State’s law. He would then have to assess whether and to what extent a 
mental injury occurred in the respective Member State and how such distress is 
relieved there. Bearing in mind the differences in each jurisdiction and each pro-
tected domain due to cultural, political and socio-legal reasons as well as divergent 
codification techniques, such a Herculean task should not be left to judges. One 
can sincerely doubt whether practice could ever meet this standard of factual and 
legal accuracy.16 In cases with a substantial circulation, the judge will not and 
essentially cannot, apply all respective laws. As a result, the judge, arguably, will 
estimate the wrongful conduct and damages as a whole and subsequently extrapo-
late both the local wrongful conduct and local damages according to the extent of 
dissemination in the respective countries. As a realistic alternative, parties may 
                                                           
16 So far no European Member State court has employed the mosaic assessment in 
that regard. For experiences in the US see e.g. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3rd 
Cir. 1948): “[…] we must treat […] the place where publication occurred as covering the 
United States and the civilized countries of the world” and the comment by W.L. PROSSER, 
Interstate Publication, Mich. L. Rev. 1993, p. 973: “That way madness lies” and LEARNED 
HAND, J. in Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 176 F.2d 897, 900 (2nd Cir. 1949): “[…] in 
application it would prove unmanageable.” 
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bring (as the Duchess did)17 their action solely in respect of the damage caused 
within the Member State’s territory. Of course, in such a way the aggrieved party 
will either fall short of full compensation or has to pursue his or her claims in a 
number of courts throughout Europe. 
One final criticism can be levelled against the proposed mosaic assessment 
in the everyday case, where the paparazzo, the journalist and the editor-in-chief 
jointly contribute to one wrongful publication. If one of the tortfeasors is held per-
sonally liable and seeks contribution from his or her accomplices, he will face 
significant problems. According to Art 20 Rome II Regulation, internal redress 
among multiple tortfeasors is governed by the law applicable to the original claim. 
As a result, the same multitude of laws that were applied to the publication must 
then be applied to the internal redress. One must bear in mind that such redress 
differs in all European Member States, ranging from proportional liability to the 
total exclusion of such claims. As a result, in lieu of one applicable law to the 
original claim, a coherent redress action between the tortfeasors seems impossible. 
The conflict of laws based mosaic assessment cannot fulfil its own dog-
matic standard for the assessment of wrongful conduct or damages. Provided the 
aggrieved party wants to be compensated for the full, internationally-distributed 
publication, either the judge at the domicile of the media outlet must depart from 
the dogmatically sound conflict of laws approach by “guessing” an appropriate 
injury and corresponding damages or the aggrieved party is left to sue in multiple 
countries or for only partial compensation. Finally, the hope of simple internal 
redress amongst multiple tortfeasors would in any case be entirely corrupted. 
 
 
C. Alternative Application of Several Laws 
1. By Choice of the Aggrieved Party 
In response, some scholars18 have argued for a general presumption in favour of 
allowing the aggrieved party a choice on the applicable between the law at the 
residence of the publisher and the law at one place of dissemination. The connect-
ing factors proposed by the ECJ ought to be retained but the aggrieved party should 
choose only one of them, so only one law is applied.  
To some extent this was recently accepted by the ECJ for online publica-
tions. In eDate, the court allowed the plaintiff three options for the competent 
court: (1) to bring an action for all the damage caused before courts of the Member 
State in which the publisher is established; (2) to bring an action before the courts 
of each Member State in which the content was physically distributed for the 
                                                           
17 See Tribunal de grande instance Nanterre 18.09.2012, Catherine Elizabeth 
Middleton et a. c/ Sas Mondadori Magazine France et a., Légipresse Octobre 2012,  
No. 298. 
18 See G. HOHLOCH, in Erman, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, vol. II (12th ed.), Köln 
2008, Art. 40 EGBGB, para. 53; F. VISCHER in Zürcher Kommentar, IPRG (2nd ed.), Zürich 
2004, Art. 139 IPRG, para. 12; A.F. SCHNITZER, Gegenentwurf für ein schweizerisches IPR-
Gesetz, Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung 1980, p. 314; K. SIEHR, Das Internationale 
Privatrecht der Schweiz, Zürich 2002, p. 378. 
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damage that occurred in the Member State of this court; and (3) only for online 
publications, before the courts of the Member State in which the centre of his or 
her interests is based, that is to say, often his or her habitual residence.19 Parallel to 
the ECJ’s findings and rendered as a conflict of laws rule, this would read as a 
choice for the aggrieved party between the mosaic assessment and his or her 
habitual residence.20 
Both solutions may be welcomed. This is, partly, because the fragmentation 
of applicable laws which would result from a mosaic assessment is dismissed (at 
least in part) and also because only one Member State’s law would be applied, 
which would ease the judge’s burden, reflect the uniformity of the non-pecuniary 
damages correctly and allow for a simple internal redress among multiple 
tortfeasors.  
Nevertheless, the substantive law concept of balancing the conflicting inter-
ests of tortfeasor and aggrieved party would be ignored, as both approaches take 
only the interests of one party into account – here, those of the allegedly aggrieved 
party. It seems excessive that only one party should have the opportunity to prefer 
his or her interests alone without any further justification. 
 
 
2. By Means of Publication Technique  
Finally, as the case of the Duchess clearly demonstrates, tying the aggrieved 
party’s choice to a purely technical differentiation between physical publication 
and publication online, as suggested by the ECJ as a way to identify the competent 
court, is rather odd in the common scenario of distribution of the same content both 
in print and online. Pursuant to the eDate principle rendered as a conflict of laws 
rule, English law would be applied in the Duchess’ claim to the whole damage 
sustained due to the online publication, whereas the judgment on the print product 
would be limited to the damage that occurred in the UK only. If the Duchess 
sought full compensation, she could file a claim in England for the online content, 
which is subject to English common law, and simultaneously in France for the 
print version. In less clear-cut cases, such as those involving the caricatures of the 
prophet Mohammed, this approach would obviously create the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments for virtually identical content. 
 
                                                           
19 ECJ, C-509/09, eDate Advertising GmbH v. X and C-161/10, Olivier Martinez and 
Robert Martinez v. MGN Limited. 
20 The German Bundesgerichtshof referred whether Art 3(1) and (2) of Directive 
2000/31/EC (“e-commerce Directive ”), OJ 2000 L 178, p. 1 had the character of a conflict 
of laws rule requiring the exclusive application of the law in force in the Member State of 
origin or whether they operate as a corrective measure to the law declared to be applicable 
pursuant to the national conflict of laws rules. In a nutshell, the ECJ held that the liability 
standards applied to an electronic commerce service shall not made subject to stricter 
requirements than those provided for by the substantive law applicable in the Member State 
of origin (para 68). In any case this ruling applies only to providers of an electronic 
commerce service in the sense of Art 3(1) of the Directive and is thus only of limited 
interest within the ambit of this article.  
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D. Identifying an Exclusive Connection 
As shown above, a distributive or alternative application of a multitude of laws 
does not provide an adequate mechanism to deal with cross-border infringements 
of privacy and reputation. Instead, a viable solution to the shortcomings addressed 
could be the application of a single law identified by using the principle of closest 
connection and calculated by assessing factors relevant to the individual cases. 
Such factors include the following: 
 
 
1. Habitual Residence of the Aggrieved Party 
The draft of the European Group for Private International Law (EGPIL)21, the pre-
liminary draft proposal of the European Commission (2003)22 and (to a lesser 
extent) the judgment of the ECJ in eDate and the recent Proposal of the European 
Parliament23 have argued in general for the application of the law of the state of the 
habitual residence of the aggrieved party. 
The application of that law is convenient at first glance. A general assump-
tion that the result of an invasion of personality rights is generally within the 
contemplation of the public at the domicile of the aggrieved party is not misplaced. 
Additionally, four fundamental interests of the aggrieved party will be best encom-
passed and represented at his or her habitual residence. Firstly, the aggrieved party 
will be familiar with the legal order and rules (at least in layman’s terms). 
Secondly, the aggrieved party has an interest in maintaining his or her good stand-
ing within his or her chosen social environment, which will be respected by 
applying the law of the habitual residence. The major focus of such actions is to 
remedy a loss of reputation, so it seems natural to focus on these legal, moral and 
cultural conceptions crystallised at the domicile of the aggrieved party. Application 
of the law of an aggrieved party’s habitual residence would also be endorsed by the 
national society, as the nation’s citizens would not be judged according to foreign 
standards. Thirdly, it is reasonable to assess the aggrieved party’s non-pecuniary 
damages according to the standards at his or her habitual residence, because the 
restitution of harm will be carried out in this country. Hence, market prices there 
will be decisive in assessing the amount of damages, as alternative comforts and 
pleasures are likely to be bought at the aggrieved party’s domicile. Fourthly and 
finally, in many cases it is a clear advantage that the law at the domicile of the 
aggrieved party is a connecting factor to only one law, correctly representing the 
uniformity of non-pecuniary damages.  
There are also arguments against the use of habitual residence. Any appli-
cation of such local law will not be suitable in cases where the aggrieved party has 
only a formal domicile in a certain country but is not socially integrated into the 
                                                           
21 Available at <http://www.gedip-egpil.eu>. 
22 Art 7 COM 2003 427 final, 2003/0168 (COD). 
23 Report with recommendations to the Commission on the amendment of 
Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome 
II) 2009/2170 (INI)), p. 8. 
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local community. These concerns take on increased strength in the case of a public 
figure or celebrity, as such persons tend to have multiple domiciles in different 
States and – unsurprisingly, due to lifestyle or employment – alternate between 
them. The assumption that the interests of the aggrieved party are inseparably 
connected to his or her domicile simply does not reflect the itinerant lifestyles of 
persons of public interest.  
Furthermore, the substantive law concept of balancing conflicting interests 
of both parties militates against a shift to a connecting factor which focuses on the 
aggrieved party alone. The application of the law at the domicile of the aggrieved 
party is not inherently more just than applying the law of the habitual residence of 
the relevant media outlet or, indeed, at other places of distribution. The interests of 
the media outlet are being considered only after the benefit of knowledge of the 
applicable law is given to the aggrieved party. The idea that a national society has a 
strong interest in applying its moral and legal rules to one of its citizens again 
betrays a single minded focus on the aggrieved party, even though the society in 
which the media outlet has its residence has the same interests.  
These are not mere dogmatic objections. The sole application of the law of 
the habitual residence of the aggrieved party will lead to unreasonable difficulties 
for any media company with serious coverage of foreign affairs, because an over-
whelming multitude of laws must be adhered to. The media company would 
consequently be obliged to undertake in-depth investigations into the law of the 
presumed effective state of habitual residence of each person on whom they wish 
to report. Besides the tremendous costs of research into foreign laws, such an 
approach would inevitably lead to situations where critical coverage (e.g. carica-
tures of the Prophet) would be impossible, such as where blasphemy is punished 
domestically. If such regimentation of the free press existed (effectively, as a tort 
action for blasphemy, heresy or apostasy) that restrictive law would be applied 
even where a media company respected all standards of journalism in the law at its 
domicile. As a result, the application of the law of the habitual residence of the 
aggrieved party would obviously pose a significant impediment to media 
freedom.24 
 
 
2. Habitual Residence of the Publisher 
The application of the law at the domicile of the media outlet obviously addresses 
the latter argument with regard to the restriction of media freedom. The law of the 
statutory seat, central administration or principal place of business of the media 
outlet will be clear to the company’s journalists, photographers, and legal consult-
ants. Thus, this connecting factor encompasses the need that liability – the grounds 
for the imputation of damage – must be determinable by the journalist and the 
media outlet before publication. As mentioned, any unforeseeable application of a 
norm amounts to normative and official arbitrariness, labelled in the area of media 
                                                           
24 See Th. KADNER GRAZIANO, Europäisches Internationales Deliktsrecht, Tübingen 
2003, p. 87; J. VON HEIN, Das Günstigkeitsprinzip im Internationalen Deliktsrecht, 
Tübingen 1999, p. 328 both with extensive further reference. 
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freedom as a “chilling effect” by the ECtHR. If, as emphasised several times by 
that court, the potential deterrent effect of an overly strict liability rule risks 
resulting in the general disappearance of critical journalism, any such norm is 
incompatible with the ECHR. Any rule whose application is unforeseeable must 
similarly be incompatible, as the media company could not anticipate its applica-
tion. The same applies where there is a conflict of laws rule which renders a 
national rule applicable, but unforeseeably so. Where the unforeseeable rule is of a 
much more stringent standard than the corresponding rule in the foreseeable coun-
tries of distribution, legal certainty is violated.  
Nevertheless, applying the law of the habitual residence of the aggrieved 
party and the law at the statutory seat of the media outlet are two sides of the same 
coin – the connection takes only the interests of one party into account. Of course, 
the aggrieved party’s legitimate expectations focus on the protection provided by 
the law of the country where he participates in public discourse and, thereby, 
exposes his or her rights and interests to potential infringement. Beyond the need 
for foreseeable imputation of damage, there is no compelling argument for treating 
the aggrieved party’s interests in being compensated, both in the estimation of his 
or her fellow compatriots and financially, inferior to other interests. It seems odd to 
subjugate the interests of the victims to those of the tortfeasor to the extent that the 
latter’s standard determines even the entitlement to compensation. 
 
 
 
IV. Centre of Gravity 
The analysis above demonstrates that seeking to isolate one sole factor to govern 
the process of identifying the applicable law is a fruitless and ultimately unjust 
exercise; no single connecting factor can hope to produce justice in all situations. 
Instead, systems incorporating several connecting factors could be established, 
which in essence establish a centre of gravity and thereby the closest connection. 
 
 
A.  Methodologies 
1. Deductive Reasoning and Subsidiary References 
One starting point could be to simply formulate several conditions to be met in 
order to determine the law with the closest connection. Any rule can be analysed 
and restated as a compound conditional statement in the form “if X, then Y”. The 
second part (“then Y”), commonly known as apodosis, is prescriptive and for our 
purpose evidently clear. It is the law with the closest connection and, thus, pre-
scribes the one law applicable. The first part, (“if X”), the protasis, indicates the 
scope of the rule by designating the conditions under which the rule applies. A 
solution could be a protasis of several conditions to be met in order to specify one 
applicable law. Such a protasis would, in stages, exclude legal systems with only a 
minimal connection to the case or none at all. 
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2. A Flexible System 
Concurrently, one may also argue for a more flexible approach. European legal 
systems rely on a comprehensive balancing of the interests of both parties in 
determining whether there was even a right to privacy or reputation at all and, if so, 
whether this right was infringed. Inevitably, such comprehensive balancing can 
apply to the corresponding conflict of laws rule. In other words, no clear-cut 
protasis would be formulated, but instead only a set of elements that would be 
taken into account when prescribing the protasis. 
Such a methodology is not a revolutionary innovation to conflict of laws. In 
fact, this methodology was already present in the pre-Rome II regimes of a number 
of systems. For example, the UK position on the applicable law in this area can be 
found in the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. Sec. 
11 states that: “Where elements of those events [torts] occur in different countries, 
the applicable law under the general rule is to be taken as being […] the law of the 
country in which the most significant element or elements of those events 
occurred.” 
 
 
3. Common Features 
The guiding aim of both solutions is to apply the law with the closest connection to 
the case either by focusing on a set of fixed, clear-cut conditional connecting 
factors or by avoiding an overly rigid structure. Both systems are apt to better take 
into account the complementary features of additional connecting factors, thereby 
balancing the interests of all parties. Both approaches must explicitly identify all 
the relevant factors within such cases and, in the case of a flexible system, then 
weigh these elements according to their relevance. Ultimately, the law determined, 
that is the law with the closest connection, should govern the whole case at hand. 
 
 
B. Elements 
1. Perception of the Public 
As demonstrated, the aim of applying only the one law with the closest connection 
to the whole case does not produce a compelling result when only the law at the 
domicile of the media outlet or the aggrieved party is automatically applied. 
However, the tortfeasor and aggrieved party are not the only interested parties. One 
key paradigm in substantive law provides that the assessment of whether or not the 
privacy and reputation of a person is harmed depends above all on the way in 
which the particular national community evaluates the situation. Accordingly, how 
the defamatory publication is perceived by the general public in the respective 
publication’s state must also play a crucial role for the conflict of laws rule.  
Reference to the place where such public considers a publication to have 
violated an individual’s reputation or privacy seems a compelling starting point, as 
this does not favour the interest of any one party and cannot be easily manipulated 
by either party.  
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Nevertheless, the crux of the matter, i.e. to apply only one law, remains an 
issue if a publication was widely distributed. At least in the first world, the sheer 
number of potentially applicable laws from States where a publication was dis-
seminated is likely to overburden any sizeable news provider. Hence, within either 
approach a further element must be introduced to isolate a single applicable law. 
 
 
2. Foreseeability of the Applicable Law 
A necessary condition of any conflict of laws rule ought to be that only those legal 
systems for which the application of their law could be foreseen by the defendant 
should be open for application. Just as substantive law requires foreseeable criteria 
to impute an infringement of privacy and reputation to the media outlet, the 
conflict of laws solution should require the additional element of foreseeability to 
justify the application of a distinct law providing for the latters’ responsibility. 
Two points may be raised against such foreseeability of the applicable law. 
Firstly, Member State’s substantive privacy and defamation laws generally impose 
liability only for intended or foreseeable publication. As a result, it is arguable that 
foreseeability is not needed in conflict of laws. The fact that European legal sys-
tems provide for either an objective or subjective assessment of such foreseeability 
militates against such “subsequent” application. The tortfeasor’s conduct will be 
assessed with reference to the objective ordinary person, which in this case is the 
typical occupational skills of journalists. The subjective standard is whether differ-
ent conduct was to be expected from this given journalist in this given situation. 
Depending on the relevant standard in the State of publication, results regarding 
the imputation of liability may differ, thus interfering with the conflict of laws 
paradigm of reaching a harmony of outcomes in similar cases. Moreover, such an 
approach is impractical. It would involve initially applying a Member State’s law 
only to subsequently discover that under said law the imputation of liability was 
ultimately unforeseeable. Unnecessary and at times tremendous costs could be 
saved and possible deficiencies of research into foreign laws could also be avoided. 
Secondly, in the eDate judgment the ECJ rejected such an approach with 
regard to online publications. The court held that “content may be consulted […] 
irrespective of any intention on the part of the person who placed it in regard to its 
consultation beyond that person’s Member State of establishment and outside of 
that person’s control.”25 Respectfully, the court has digital feet of clay, as this state-
ment ignores the technical reality of today’s online media. Most networks, 
including all computers on the Internet, use the TCP/IP protocol as the standard for 
communicating on a network. In the TCP/IP protocol, the unique identifier for any 
computer is called its Internet Protocol address (IP address). Computers use this 
unique identifier to send data to other specific computers on a network. Just as any 
website has a unique IP address,26 the user himself or herself provides his or her 
                                                           
25 ECJ, C-509/09, eDate Advertising GmbH v. X and C-161/10, Olivier Martinez and 
Robert Martinez v. MGN Limited, para 45. 
26 For example, the ISP of the Swiss Institute for Comparative law (<www.isdc.ch>) 
has the IP address 80.83.47.148, and its server is hosted (with 13 others) at Travers, 
Switzerland. 
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own IP address when requesting the website’s content. Of course, media outlets 
utilize the user’s data. For instance, when visiting some websites most users will 
have noticed an advertisement on that page directly markets them or that a specific 
page or information therein is blocked. Such advertising or blocking is commonly 
known as geo-targeting and is done by analysing the location of the user’s IP 
address or analysing the hops in a trace route of the user’s IP address.27 Of course, 
the information gathered will mostly point to the geographical location of the 
user’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) only.28 Nevertheless, as these providers typi-
cally exist on a national level, even the most rudimentary form of geo-targeting 
will be able to identify the user’s country and could thereby allow or deny access 
accordingly.29 Thus, it is possible to identify a specific address or exclude a specific 
national public to make the application of a Member State’s law foreseeable.30 
Of course, the term “foreseeable” then needs to be characterised within 
conflict of laws, an issue which cannot be addressed in detail here. Nevertheless, 
comparative studies reveal that both a majority of European legal systems and 
secondary EU law favour an objective approach together with an abstract 
assessment of behaviour.31 Thus, the concept of autonomous characterisation 
employed by the ECJ, which provides that concepts in conflict of laws “must be 
given an autonomous meaning, derived from […] the general principles underlying 
the national systems as a whole,”32 will in all likelihood result in the application of 
                                                           
27 Plenty of more sophisticated tools are available, e.g. Google Analytics. 
28 The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA, see <http://www.iana.org/>) 
delegates allocations of IP address blocks to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), for Europe 
to the Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) (see 
<http://www.ripe.net/>), which subsequently distributes IP address blocks to Local Internet 
Registries (LIR). LIRs (i.e. Internet Service Providers, enterprises, or academic institutions) 
assign most parts of this block to its own customers.  
RIPE provides a public database containing registration details of the IP addresses 
originally allocated to members by the RIPE NCC. The database provides information 
which organisations or individuals currently hold which Internet number resources, when 
the allocations were made and contact details, see <http://www.ripe.net/data-tools/db>. 
29 For all Internet Websites running on Apache HTTP Server (currently more than 
50% of all Webservers worldwide, see <http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/06/06/june-
2013-web-server-survey-3.html>) it is extremely easy to deny visitors from select countries 
to access a website with two easy commands (“deny, allow access”) in the .htaccess-file. For 
instance, to block all traffic from Switzerland some 50 IP-ranges will be blocked, all easily 
to manage, see e.g. <http://www.ip2location.com/free/visitor-blocker>, <https://www. 
countryipblocks.net/country_selection.php>. 
30 It is submitted here that the bypassing of blocked content on a website with the 
help of proxy-servers or IP-spoofing would amount to fraus legis and should, thus, be 
unforeseeable.  
31 See P. WIDMER, Comparative Report on Fault as a Basis of Liability and Criterion 
of Imputation, in P. WIDMER (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Fault, Wien/ New York 2005, 
p. 347 et seq., paras 39 et seq.; M. KELLNER, Comparative Report, in H. KOZIOL/ R. 
SCHULZE (eds), Tort Law of the European Community, Wien/ New York 2008, p. 564, No. 
22/19. 
32 ECJ, case 29/76, LTU Lufttransportunternehmen v. Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 1541. 
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an objective standard. Thus, the question of whether the journalist was able to 
foresee the imputation of liability abroad will most certainly be assessed objec-
tively, that is with regard to the typical occupational skills of the group of 
journalists. 
Still, in the world of modern media it is clear that any test based on the fore-
seeable perception of the public will continue to result in multiple applicable laws, 
such as is the case for online publications. Finding only one applicable law must 
then involve assessing an additional suitable connecting factor to one of these 
systems. 
 
 
3. Social Connections of the Aggrieved Party 
Where the system in which the aggrieved party habitually resides is among the 
systems where the public foreseeably conceived the publication, it stands out as a 
suitable narrowing factor. 
Firstly, a significant part of the aftermath of an infringement of privacy or 
reputation will occur within the social environment of the aggrieved party, 
wherever that may be. Because the major focus of the relevant action is to remedy 
the harm caused to the aggrieved party’s reputation in the eyes of that person’s 
contemporaries, it seems correct to focus on the place of domicile. Besides, this 
connecting factor serves as a simple proxy for the place where the party maintains 
his or her significant social connection. Such connection may also include the 
country in which the family of the aggrieved party lives or where the predominant 
numbers of business contacts exist.33 
Secondly, so as to adequately respect the interests of the media outlet, 
attention must then be given to the aggrieved party’s compensation. It seems right 
to assess the aggrieved party’s non-pecuniary damages according to the standards 
at his or her habitual residence, because the restitution of harm will arguably be 
performed in this country. Hence, the market prices there will be decisive for the 
assessment of damages as alternative comforts and pleasures are likely to be 
bought at the aggrieved party’s domicile. 
Nevertheless, where changes of domicile are frequent or a person enjoys an 
international reputation, the assumption of a connection between the aggrieved 
party and a particular identifiable social environment either does not exist may be 
difficult to determine, or may be entirely arbitrary.  
Moreover, any approach based on deductive reasoning, i.e. the staggered 
exclusion of legal systems is limited in cases where the all-important public was 
addressed by a defamatory statement in countries other than the country of the 
domicile of the aggrieved party.34 Here, the domicile of the aggrieved party cannot 
                                                           
33 For this approach see e.g. OGH (Austrian Supreme Court) 8 Ob 235/74, 
Juristische Blätter 1976, p. 103. 
34 See e.g. the case of Kurt Waldheim, United Nations Secretary-General (1972-
1981) and President of Austria (1986-1992), who faced accusations in US-Media for his 
service as an intelligence officer in the Wehrmacht during World War II and was 
nevertheless elected to power at home. Throughout his term as Austrian president, 
Waldheim and his wife Elisabeth were officially deemed personae non gratae by the United 
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be applied as subsidiary connecting factor to single out one applicable law from the 
states of publication. Thus, it is not possible to formulate a protasis incorporating 
both conditions. 
 
 
4. Extent of Publication 
A suitable alternative approach would be to focus on the extent of distribution 
within the various systems.35 The law of the system in which the most extensive 
distribution has taken place may be the most appropriate, as the aggrieved party 
will be able to serve both his or her own interests and also to satisfy a wider socie-
tal function. As mentioned at the outset, to avoid the persistence of a false picture 
of the aggrieved party due to repetition which would be the result of extensive 
circulation balanced media coverage can only be secured when the aggrieved party 
can generate a counterweight to such repetition. By pursuing his or her own inter-
ests in the State with the greatest distribution, this spiral of silence may be best 
avoided and the overall, international momentum of distribution reversed. 
Again, in the eDate judgment the ECJ revealed a lacuna of judicial 
knowledge with regard to information technology when it indicated that the extent 
of distribution is technically impossible to quantify with regard to online content.36 
On the contrary, the geo-tagging tools described above show that there is sufficient 
information in the website server’s access log to determine the locations with the 
greatest numbers of accessing users, as such data is essential to online marketing. 
However, there are limits to this approach. If only a small number of 
defamatory publications reach a system where the aggrieved party had extremely 
significant social connections, the latter – arguably appropriate law – would not be 
applied. For instance, if the aggrieved party maintains significant business contacts 
in a certain system and only a very limited amount of coverage concerning the 
aggrieved party was distributed there, yet the parties significant business contacts 
received them, the non-application of this law could result in an inappropriate 
restriction in favour of the defendant.37 Again, a protasis enclosing all conditions 
will fail. 
 
 
C. Conclusion 
Any clear-cut, conditional rule comes with such rigidity that it may do serious 
injustice in many particular cases. As a result, having identified the failings of 
                                                                                                                                      
States. See J. VON HEIN, Das Günstigkeitsprinzip im Internationalen Deliktsrecht, Tübingen 
1999, p. 335. 
35 See P. LAGARDE, (note 6), at 501. 
36 ECJ, C-509/09, eDate Advertising GmbH v. X and C-161/10, Olivier Martinez and 
Robert Martinez v. MGN Limited, para. 45. 
37 See OGH (Austrian Supreme Court) 8 Ob 235/74, Juristische Blätter 1976, p. 103; 
G. WAGNER, Ehrenschutz und Pressefreiheit im europäischen Zivilverfahrens- und 
Internationalen Privatrecht, RabelsZ 1998, p. 276. 
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overly rigid rule, a more adaptable solution for cross-border infringements to 
reputation and privacy is advocated. What follows is one suggestion for how such a 
flexible system based on the above analysis of all relevant elements might be 
arranged: 
If the publication was viewed in multiple countries, the law of the country 
to which the publication has the closest connection shall be applied. In determining 
this closest connection, the utmost weight is given to a balanced and predictable 
solution because fairness and predictability are the fundamental principles of any 
legal system and essential for the legitimacy of the law.  
Firstly, fairness normally results when applying the law of the country 
where the public perceived the publication, as this does not favour the interests of 
any one party and cannot be easily manipulated by either party. A flexible rule 
would thus read as follows. 
The more one of the states represents the public perceiving the 
publication or broadcast, the more this state’s law should be applied.  
Secondly, predictability of the application of these laws must be based on the test 
of whether an ordinary defendant media outlet could objectively foresee that the 
public in another state would perceive the publication. A second flexible rule 
would thus read as follows.  
The more the perception of a state’s public was objectively 
foreseeable to the defendant media outlet, the more this state’s law 
should be applied. 
Thirdly, the aggrieved party’s social connection would then be assessed, estab-
lishing the extent and type of harm suffered. This results in a third, consecutive yet 
flexible rule. 
The more one of the states where the public perceives the publication 
or broadcast foreseeably represents the social connections, especially 
the habitual residence of the aggrieved party, the more this state’s 
law should be applied. 
Finally, the nature and the quantity of the distribution of the publication within 
each legal system must be assessed. A final flexible rule could thus read as follows. 
The higher the extent of distribution of the publication was between 
of states where the public foreseeably perceived the publication, the 
more the more this state’s law should be applied. 
Of course such a rule could be rendered in the negative.  
The application of a national law has to be the more dismissed, the 
less this legal system represents the perception by the public of an 
infringing publication or broadcast, the less the application of this 
law was objectively foreseeable for the defendant media outlet, the 
less this system represents the social connection of aggrieved party 
and the less this publication or broadcast was distributed in this legal 
system. 
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Finally, with a view to the Rome II Regulation and with more weight on the 
perception of the public and the foreseeability for the defendant media outlet, 
another suitable phrasing could be the following. 
In the case of a non-contractual obligation arising out of violations of 
privacy or rights relating to personality, including defamation, the 
law of the state where the perception of the public of the infringing 
publication or broadcast was objectively foreseeable for the 
defendant shall be applied. 
If the publication or broadcast was perceived within multiple coun-
tries, the law of the country to which the publication or broadcast has 
the closest connection shall be applied. This closest connection is 
determined by weighing each of the following factors: the social 
connection of the aggrieved party to each country, especially the 
common habitual residence of the aggrieved party; and the nature 
and extent of distribution within each country. 
 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This analysis of cross-border invasions to privacy and honour discloses a pressing 
need for reform. The status quo is antiquated and the European legislator is called 
for reform. Pan-European media markets – even in the absence of the Internet – are 
an increasing feature of modern life. The easy availability of media on- and offline, 
distributed far beyond the national borders of a media outlet’s home state, and an 
information-hungry public are apt to produce even more complicated cross-border 
infractions in the coming years. 
In lieu of a European consensus on the legal protection accorded to reputa-
tion and privacy, these problems are best tackled by an explicitly flexible conflict 
of laws rule like the one suggested here. Only such a rule is adequately respectful 
of the importance of balancing journalism against privacy and reputation as well as 
the interests of both media outlets and the subjects of injurious media coverage. 
Nonetheless, proponents of such flexible rules are at times confronted by a 
standard counter-argument of endangering legal certainty. Rather, quite the oppo-
site seems to be correct. Predictability of the outcome of any rule can only be 
achieved when courts clearly consider and state the relevant factors and their 
weight in respective judgments. Only addressing and weighing the relevant ele-
ments – rather than manipulating law and facts to avoid inequitable results – 
renders decisions predictable.  
In particular, from the perspective of conflict of laws these counter-
arguments may also be ignored. A flexible system is especially appropriate for an 
area of law which was essentially always a flexible system. Conflict of laws never 
was and still is not governed by rigid rules, but instead strives for a flexible 
approach using the standard of the closest connection.  
